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Choice of Forum and Public Policy:
SOME INDICATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT
IN UNITED STATES LAW OF A,
DISTINCT "INTERNATIONAL" PUBLIC POLICY
by Gabriel M. Wilner*
Introduction - What is "international" public policy?
In this decade, the United States Supreme Court decided two
cases which revolved around the enforceability of choice of forum
clauses contained in transnational commercial contracts. The decisions
which the Court rendered reshaped significantly the legal contours of
the enforceability of such clauses. In the two cases, the Court signaled
that it was prepared to recognize the distinction between what may be
termed "internal" public policy and what may be termed "international" public policy. The recognition of this.distinction is likely to have
a vital bearing on the right of persons to provide for a specific foreign
judicial or arbitral forum as part of the transnational agreement into
which they have entered.
Before discussing the impact of the two cases on the effectiveness
of choice of forum clauses, it is appropriate to define the two varieties
of public policy, particularly in terms of how they pertain to issues
raised by choice of forum clauses. The relationship between "internal"
public policy and "international" public policy has an approximate
analogue in the distinction made in French law between ordre public
interne and ordre public international. The distinction is that one set of
standards is applied to transactions which are performed in a local
context, while another set of standards is applied to transactions which
have international elements. An example of the former class of
transactions is a contract which is entered into by two nationals and
which is to be performed within their country; an example of the latter
class of transactions is a contract which is entered into by persons of
different nationalities and which is to be performed in a country other
than the place where the contract is entered into.
The standards required by ordre public interne are parts of the total
law of the forum from which there may be no derogation. The
standards required by ordre public international can differ from standards of the local law of the forum, provided that the transaction
contains sufficient transnational elements. Nevertheless, there remain
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia; A.B., College of William and
Mary; D.P.A., University of Exeter; LLB., LLM, Columbia University. Mr. Wilner is
currently on a year's leave of absence at the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. This article is based generally on a talk given at the 1975 Fordham
Corporate Law Institute on International Projects (Evaluating-FinancingNegotiating).
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certain forum law standards that even transnational transactions must
meet. That is, the ordre public international of the forum is deemed to
include certain of the standards required by the ordre public interne of
the forum.1
The problem and the two United States Supreme Court cases
Parties to a transnational commercial contract may decide that
they would prefer that their future disputes be decided in a particular
judicial or arbitral forum. This preference will be based on a variety of
reasons. The articulation of such a preference will avoid forum shopping; and, above all, it will avoid the possibility that suit will be
brought in a forum which one of the parties considers hostile, biased or
incompetent, or in a forum which will be likely to apply rules of law
detrimental to the interests of one or the other of the parties. Propelled
by any or all of these reasons, the parties may include in their
agreement a clause granting jurisdiction over claims arising out of the
contract to one or more judicial fora or to an arbitral forum.
Any judicial forum which is named is unlikely to refuse to take
jurisdiction. This is true whether the clause calls for-exclusive jurisdiction or not. As we will see, in a case that willtbe discussed in detail
below, the English courts took jurisdiction in the controversy between
a United States corporation and a West German corporation a ship of
which, the Bremen, had undertaken towage under an agreement
which provided: "Any dispute arising must be treated before the
London Court of Justice." 2 Almost without exception, a designated
It must be stressed that, despite the use of the word "international" in
describing one of the two types of public policy, both types of public policy should not
normally be considered in any context other than that of the national legal system of
the forum. See, e.g., H. BATTIFOL & P. LAGARDE, 1 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (6th ed.
1974) §§365-369. At section 366, the authors are critical of the common use of the
words "international' and "internal" to distinguish between the public policy standards. They state, in discussing ordre public international, that "the expression is
scarcely a happy one since this ordre public is essentially national and opposes itself
specifically to the normal international order which is the application of the competent
laws .... The surest terminology, when the specification appears useful, consists in
addressing ordre public in the sense of conflict of laws (droit internationalprive) or ordre

public in the sense of internal private law (droit civil interne)." (This author's translation). Battifol and Lagarde cite the reader to Cour de Cassation cases which have used
the terminology which they suggest to be superior. This author, while grasping the
point made about the nature of "international" public policy, does not believe that the
use of the word "international" poses any danger as long as the national nature of
public policy as public policy as applied presently by national courts is understood.
Perhaps, in order to avoid confusion, the word "transnational" should be substituted
for "international".
2 Unierweser Reederei, Gmbh. v. Zapata Off-Shore Company 2 Lloyd's List L. R.
158 (1968). On the other hand, in Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia Inc., 503 F.2d 955 (1975),
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not enforce the following clause because
it did not consider it to be "a mandatory forum-selection clause": "This agreement shall
be construed and enforceable according to the law of the State of New York and the
parties submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of New York." Id. at 956 (emphasis
added).
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judicial forum will accept and exercise any jurisdiction conferred on it
under a contractual agreement. The real problem arises when nondesignated courts are asked to stay an action in favor of a designated
foreign forum.
If, as it seems likely, a United States firm will have difficulty in
persuading other parties to an international commercial agreement to
choose a United States forum, what alternatives are available to the
United States firm? In general, they include the courts of the other
parties (e.g., the courts located at the other parties' main places of
business), the courts of the place where the transaction is to be
performed, a neutral forum or a combination of these alternatives.
How'will the courts of the United States treat a choice of forum
clause calling for the jurisdiction of a foreign court? Before 1971, United
States courts were likely to disregard such a clause whenever an
American party to the agreement brought a suit in a United States
forum. The public policy-based reasons given by the courts were
threefold: the superior convenience of the United States forum, possible prejudice abroad, and the likelihood of non-application of United
States law by the foreign court.
In 1971, however, the United States Supreme Court initiated a
movement in the opposite direction. In deciding The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Corporations,3 the Court stated: "Here we see an American
company with special expertise contracting with a foreign company to
tow a complex machine thousands of miles across seas and oceans. The
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our law and in our
courts." '4 The Court acknowledged that the United States courts had
been divided on the matter, but pointed to acceptance of this aspect of
freedom of contract in other countries. The Court then added: "Not
surprisingly, foreign businessmen prefer, as do we, to have disputes
resolved in their own courts, but if that choice is not available, then in a
neutral forum."'5 The Court noted that in this case the choice of the
forum had been made in arms-length negotiation by businessmen.
Moveover, according to the Court, the parties were justified in
eliminating uncertainty as to the places where suit might be brought.
The elimination of such uncertainty by the agreement in advance on a
forum was "an indispensable element in international trade." In the
mind of the Court, then, there were "compelling reasons why a freely
negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by fraud,
3 407 U.S. 1 (1971). Among the many treatments of this complex case are
Nadelhtann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 124 (1973) and Becker & Collins, The ChapparalBremen Litigation: Two
Commentaries, 22 INT'L. & CoMP. L.Q.329 (1973).
4 407 U.S. 1, 8-9.
5 Id. at 11-12.
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undue influence, or overweening bargaining power, such as that
'6
involved here, should be given full effect."
On the strength of the above stated rationale, the Supreme Court

concluded "that the forum clause should control absent a strong
showing that it should be set aside." The correct approach, said the
Court, "would have been to enforce the forum clause specifically

unless Zapata could clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons
as fraud or overreaching." ' 7 Contravention of a strong public policy of
the forum8 and serious inconvenience, which was characterized as
inconvenience depriving the party of its day in court, were retained by

the Court as grounds for non-enforcement of the choice of forum
clause. The Supreme Court distinguished betwveen the instant case and
an earlier case, Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 9 which had involved
"towage business strictly in American waters." The Court found that
the considerations which it had set out for strictly local situations "are
not controlling in an international commercial agreement." 10
The Bremen v. Zapata has been followed, of course, in the federal
courts. I' Whether this approach would be followed in the state courts
12
remains a question.
In deciding Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 13 in 1974, the Supreme

Court confirmed (by a five to four majority) that parties to a transnaId. at 12-13.
Id. at 15.
8 Fraud and overreaching exemplify such a contravention.
9 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
6

10 407 U.S. at 16.

"Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Engineers Corp., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975). The
challenged contract provision in this case provided: "for the purposes of this contract,
the contracting parties place themselves under the jurisdiction and competence of the
courts of the Republic of Uruguay." Id. 168 n. 12; Tai Kien Industry Co. Ltd. v. M/V
Hamburg, 528 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976); In Flight Services Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
466 F.2d 220, 234 n.4 (6th Cir. 1972); Gaskin v. Stumm Handel Gmbh., 390 F. Supp.
361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. 967 (W.D.Pa. 1973); Roach v.
Hapag-Lloyd A.G., 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D.Cal. 1973). Some courts have not subscribed to the modern view. In Cooperweld Stell Co. v. Demag-MannesmannBoehler, 354 F. Supp. 571 (E.D.Pa. 1973), for example, the court, which was faced with
a standard clause selecting the "court of justice having jurisdiction in the area where
the supplier has its main office", refused to allow the application of the clause because
such application would have given German courts jurisdiction. The rationale of the
court was the traditional one. The court argued that "It was the German engineers
who had expanded their horizons into the United States .... Their business will

hardly be encouraged if they insist on trying the case in Germany because of a formal
clause ....

The court held that it was not bound by Breman because

". .

. the Supreme

Court appears to be telling us to apply MIS Bremen in admiralty cases." Id. at 573. This
is a disappointing interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision.
12 See generally Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law,
Federal Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 387 (1973).
13417 U.S. 506 (1974). See the dissent of Stevens, C. J., to the decision of the case
rendered by the Court of Appeals. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.
1973). Justice Douglas' dissent focused on the fear that an essentially local question
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tional contract are free to select an exclusive forum. The Court enforced
a clause specifying a foreign arbitral forum, 14 even though the Court
knew that enforcement could result in the non-application of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act, a piece of legislation containing the highest
("internal") public policy content. 15 The Court admitted that in a
purely domestic situation it would have been reluctant to enforce the
arbitration clause. 16
would escape the public policy rules of domestic regulation just because the question
involved some small international element. In a manner entirely consistent with his
philosphy, Justice Douglas was more anxious to protect the public than to encourage
international commerce. For a critique of the dissent, see Kling, Greater Certainty in
InternationalTransactions Through Choices of Forum, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 366, 372-73 (1975).
14 The contract provided for arbitration under the auspices of the International
Chamber of Commerce. The arbitration was to be held in Paris unless the parties
agreed otherwise. The contract also stated that the law of the State of Illinois was to
apply to and govern the agreement, "its interpretation and performance."
Commercial arbitration in the context of interstate and international transactions
has been favored through the U.S. Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
Moreover, the U.S. is now a party to the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 330 U'.N.T.S. 38 (1959) Dec. 29, 1970, 21
U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997. The U.S. has even passed enabling legislation with
respect to this Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
Article 2 of the Convention calls for the enforcement of arbitration clauses;
Articles 3 through 7 deal with enforcement of awards. In Parsons & Whittlemore
Overseas Co. v. Soci~t6 G6n6rale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969
(1974), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced a foreign arbitral award
ursuant to the Convention. An argument on public policy grounds was turned down
y the court: "We conclude, therefore, that the Convention's public policy defense
should be construed narrowly. Enforcement of foreign aibitral awards may be denied
on this basis only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic
notions of morality and justice." Id. at 974. Query: is this a standard of "international"
public policy?
Is For a discussion of reasons why, even in the context of international transactions, an arbitration clause calling for arbitration of antitrust issues should not be
given effect, see Nissen, Antitrust and Arbitration in InternationalCommerce, 17 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 110 (1976).
161n a prior case, Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the Supreme Court held that
an arbitration clause in a contract to which the 1934 Securities Exchange Act was
exclusively applicable was invalid. The contract was in a purely United States context.
This general proposition was restated in dictum in Bear v. Hayden Stone, Inc., 526
F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1975). The circuit court stated: "Arbitration is regarded with favor by
the courts; Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395... except in situations
involving protective legislation, 3 an exception not germane to this case." The footnote
referred to Wilko v. Swan for support but then added "but see Sherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co .......
As indicated by the caveat in the footnote, the choice of an arbitral forum would
appear to pose a peculiar problem to the courts. Whether the place chosen for
arbitration is within the country or state where the court called upon to enforce the
arbitration clause sits or whether the arbitral forum clause calls for another place, a
finding that the arbitration agreement is valid results in the use of a tribunal other
than the regular judicial institutions of the forum. If the arbitration clause calls for
arbitration in another country, the criteria for determining whether the transaction is
international can be utilized in deciding the enforceability of the clause. Suppose,
however, that the arbitration clause calls for arbitration in the United States and that
at least some, if not all, of the criteria for considering the transaction international are
present. Under these circumstances, will the arbitration clause be enforced? Will it be
enforced even if the subject of dispute has substantial public policy content in U.S.
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The Court characterized the arbitration clause as one type of
choice of forum clause; it relied on The Bremen v. Zapata for support.
The Court insisted that the choice of forum clause is an essential part of
the international contract. According to the Court, the parties involved
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. might not even have entered into the
contract if the forum had not been designated therein.
Thus, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. as in The Bremen v. Zapata, one
finds a recognition that a distinction exists between domestic transactions and transnational transactions. The two cases embrace the view
that transnational transactions must be encouraged and that such
transactions should therefore be subject to less restrictive standards
than purely domestic transactions. In essence, Scherk and The Bremen
reflect a recognition by the Supreme Court of "international" public
policy. That the Supreme Court has begun to formulate a set of public
policy standards peculiar to international transactions has already
made an imprint on the decision-making processes of lower federal
courts. For example, in deciding a case rooted exclusively in a United
States context, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas commented that Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. was inapplicable
17
because Scherk applied "only to international transactions.'
Conclusions
What do the two Supreme Court cases and other recent judicial
pronouncements tell the draftsmen for a United States national who is
party to a transnational commercial agreement? It appears that if a
choice of forum clause calling for the exclusive jurisdiction of one or
more foreign judicial or arbitral fora is inserted and if the agreement is
transnational in nature, the United States courts will enforce the
clause. Even though Delaume points out, in his important article in the
Journal de Droit International,18 that neither the United States courts nor
the courts in France have been able to state a satisfactory definition of a
transnational contract, the United States Supreme Court did set forth
in The Bremen v. Zapata and in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. a number of
definitional criteria. Comprising these criteria were the nationality of
the parties, the transnational character of the negotiations, the extent
of contractual performance outside the United States, and the choice of
law. Moreover, in addition to these criteria, the Court considered the
international impact of the transactions in dispute.
One further element that may well be considered is whether the
agreement was subject to actual negotiations or whether it was any one
law? Will "international" public policy standards be developed to deal with this
specific area?
17Newman v. Shearson Hamill, 383 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1974). See Starkman
v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also Comment, Exclupatory Clauses in
Towage Contracts, 49 TUL. L. REV. 392 (1975).
"I Delaume, Clauses d' lection de for et clauses compromissoires: ivolution et gestation
d'un nouveau droit am'rican, 102 J. DU DROIT INT'L [Clunet] 486, 501-502 (1975).
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of a variety of adhesion contracts. In this context, a number of cases
before the United States federal courts have raised the issue of whether
choice of judicial forum clauses in bills of lading covered by the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act should be upheld. In Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg' 9 and in Carbon Black Export Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 20 the
Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals invalidated such choice of
judicial forum clauses. The issue of the type of public policy standard
to be applied to this variety of transnational contract of carriage has not
yet reached the Supreme Court. It is not clear whether the "international" public policy standards for determining whether a choice of
forum clause is to be given effect will include a requirement that the
transnational agreement be the product of actual negotiations.
The conclusion to be drawn from the cases discussed is that the
United States party is unlikely to be able to sue in a United States
forum which, in order to take jurisdiction, would be compelled to
disregard the choice of forum clause on grounds such as forum
nonconveniens or public policy, basedarnong other things, on the fact
that the foreign forum is unlikely to apply United States law or United
States law concepts. Precisely this type of public policy argument was
rejected in The*Bremen v. Zapata. The contract which was the subject of
litigation in that case contained certain exculpatory clauses which were
invalid under United States law, but which would be valid if the
English court were to apply its own law.
Of course, in The Bremen v. Zapata, the forum chosen was neutral.
What if the forum chosen is that of the country of the other party to the
international agreement? In a case decided by a United States District
Court in New York subsequent to The Bremen v. Zapata and Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., the court was not sympathetic to the United States
party to such an agreement. In Gaskin v. Stumm Handel,21 a contractual
requirement that the parties litigate in West Germany a dispute arising
under an employment contract was upheld even though the employee
was a United States citizen.
The enforcement by a United States court of a choice of forum
clause calling for the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign court or
arbitration tribunal will have its most immediate impact on the jurisdiction of the United States courts to hear disputes arising under the
international agreement. The enforcement of such a "derogation"
clause gives the foreign forum exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, the
decision by United States courts to enforce such a clause has important
19 337 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). However, in that case, the Court of Appeals
mentioned in a footnote that an arbitration clause would not be invalidated in the
same context. See Mendelsohn, Liberalism, Choice of Forum Clauses and the Hague Rules,
2 J. MAR. L. & Comm. 661 (1971); see also Denning, Choice of Forum Clauses in Bills of
Lading, 2 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 25 (1971).
20 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958).
21 390 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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ramifications with respect to the law which is applied and with respect
to the enforcement by United States courts of the judgment rendered
abroad.
With respect to the law applied by the foreign forum, if there is a
choice of law clause in the agreement, the forum's law, including
appropriate public policy standards, will determine the validity of the
choice of law clause. In the absence of such a clause, the forum's choice
of law rules will determine the applicable law. Of course, this does not
necessarily mean that the law of the forum will be applied, but such a
possibility is strong. And, indeed, until the United States Supreme
Court decided The Bremen v. Zapata, this possibility motivated most
United States courts to reject the choice of forum clause. 22 A special
aspect of the question of what law is to govern is whether any
particular law need be applied by the arbitrator in a proceeding
pursuant-to an arbitration clause. Even if the normally applicable law is
applied, since United States courts do not review arbitration awards on
the merits, 23 the incorrect application of substantive rules will go
24
undetected.
A prerequisite to the recognition or enforcement by United States
courts of a judgment made abroad is the presence of jurisdiction in the
foreign court. If, in accordance with United States "international"
public policy standards, United States courts give effect to choice of
forum clauses in transnational agreements, such clauses providing for
exclusive foreign fora, then the acquisition by foreign courts of exclusive jurisdiction by means of these clauses becomes a generally
accepted basis of jurisdiction under United States law. In such circumstances, in an action in a United States court to enforce a judgment
or award rendered by a foreign tribunal, the defense of lack of
jurisdiction must fail. In light of the recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, it would be impossible to reconcile the recogni22

E.g., Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 337 F.2d 200. In Indussa the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals considered that, although the foreign forum would apply a statute
the content of which was the same as that of the United States statute (both Norway
and the United States were parties to the 1924 Brussels Convention on the Unification
of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading), the fact that the foreign court might
interpret differently the statute was inimical to U.S. public policy. See also, Fireman's
Fund American Insurance Companies v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492 F.2d 1294
(1st Cir. 1974). In this case, the court commented that "Although the Supreme Court
has acknowledged the Indussa decision and [has] not formally rejected [it], see The
Bremen v. Zapata . . . several passages in The Bremen opinion cast some doubt on the
underlying rationale of Indussa. See e.g., 407 U.S. at 9 ... " Id. at 1296 142. See also
Roach v. Hapag-Lloyd A.G. v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 358 F. Supp. 481
(N.D.Cal. 1973), in which the court rejected the Indussa approach in a bill of lading
context.
23 See M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 254-262 (1968).

24 For a discussion of choice of law in the context of commercial arbitration, see
Wilner, Determining the Law Governing Performance in International Arbitration: A
Comparative Study, 19 RUTGERS L, REV. 646 (1965).
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tion of the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign forum with a subsequent
refusal to enforce. a judgment rendered by that forum.
In The Bremen v. Zapata and in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the
United States Supreme Court set forth broad standards of "international" public policy. With the exception of the limits which the two
cases established, it is still too early to state the restrictions likely to be
imposed upon these standards. Indubitably, the courts will make some
inroads on the sweeping pronouncements in Scherk. It should be borne
in mind that The Bremen was an admiralty case and that Scherk arose
under both the United States Arbitration Act and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act. Whether, in diversity cases, the state courts and the
federal courts must follow the Supreme Court's pronouncements is an
unanswered question. Nevertheless, it appears that, in drafting a
choice of forum clause which provides for foreign courts or foreign
arbitral tribunals, close attention must be paid to the likelihood that the
clause will be enforced by United States courts and that, as a result, a
United States party will be unable to avoid becoming a party to
litigation abroad.
In conclusion, a choice of forum clause might be desirable if one
can negotiate for a neutral and convenient judicial or arbitral forum
and if the law to be applied to the issues that might arise is satisfactory.
The "international" public policy standards which seem to be developing will not stand in the way of a decision by the contracting parties to
choose their forum.

